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Abstract
The influence of the prior causal knowledge of subjects on the rate of learning, the
categories formed, and the attributes attended to during learning is explored .
Conjunctive concepts are thought to be easier for subjects to learn than disjunctive
concepts. Conditions are reported under which the opposite occurs. In particular, it is
demonstrated that prior knowledge can influence the rate of concept learning and that
the influence of prior causal knowledge can dominate the influence of the logical
form. A computational model of this learning task is presented. In order to represent
the prior knowledge of the subjects, an extension to explanation-based learning is
developed to deal with imprecise domain knowledge.
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The Influence of Prior Knowledge on Concept Acquisition:
Experimental and Computational Results
It has been suggested (e.g., Murphy & Medin, 1985; Pazzani, Dyer, & Flowers,
1986: Schank, Collins, & Hunter, 1986) that a person's prior kimwledge influoices the
rate or accuracyof learning. In this p^r, I explore the influenceof prior causal
knowledge on the numberof trials to learn a concept,the concepts foimed, and the
selection of attributes used to form hypotheses.
In concept identification tasks, it has been found that the logical form of a concept
influences the number of trials required to learn a concept (Dennis, Hampton, & Lea,
1973; Shepard, Hovland, & Jenkins, 1961). In particular, conjunctive ctmcepts require
fewer trials to leam than disjunctive concepts (Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956).
Here, the interaction between the prior knowledge and the logical form of concepts is
investigated. I hypothesize that the prior knowledge of the learner is as important an
influence in concept learning as the logical form of the concept.
Context dependent expectations facilitate cognition on many different tasks. For
example, prior presentation of a semantically related word increases the speed with
which words are distinguished from nonwords (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971).
Similariy, Palmer (1975) found that in the context of a face, less detail was necessary
to recognize drawings of facial parts than was necessary in isoladon. In addition, it
has been found that prior expectations influence the perception of covariation
(Chapman & Chapman, 1977,1979) and restilt in more robust judgments of
covariation by reducing the impact of atypical data points (Wright & Murphy, 1984).
This research has two goals. First, if a form of prior knowledge can reverse the
superiority of conjimctive concepts, it provides additional evidence for the importance
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of this often ignored factor on concept acquisition. Second, the type of knowledge
that subjects bringto bear on the learning task is analyzed and it is shownthat this
knowledge cannot easilybe represented as a set of inference rules withnecessary and
sufficient conditions. As such, this provides constraints on computational models of
the concept acquisition task.
Thereare two majorcomputational ^proaches to learning. Empirical learning
techniques (Michalski, 1983; Mitchell, 1982) operate bylooking for similarities and
differences betweenpositiveand negative examples of a concept Current
coiuiectionist learning techniques (e.g., Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 1986) are
essentially empirical learning techniques. Explanation-based learning (EBL)
techniques (DeJong & Mooney, 1986; Mitchell, Kedar-Cabelli, & Keller, 1986)
operate by forming a generalization from a sin^e training example by proving that the
trainingexampleis an instance of the ctmcept. The proof is constructed by an
inferenceprocess that makesuse of a domain flieorv. a set of facts and logical
implications. In explanation-based leanung,a generalization is created by retairung
only those attributes of a trainingexamplethat are necessary to prove that the training
exampleis an instanceof the concept Explanation-based learningis a generalterm for
learningmethods such as knowledge compilation (Anderson, 1989) and chunking
(Laird, Newell, & Rosenbloom, 1987) fliat create new concepts that deductively
follow from existing concepts.
Pure empiricallearningtechniques do not make use of priorknowledge during
concept acquisition. Therefore, a model of human learning thatis purely empirical
would predict thatif two learning problems aresyntactically isomorphic, theproblems
will beof equal difficulty fora human learner. A model ofhuman learning tiiat relied
solely on explanation-based learning could notaccount for the fact thatsubjects are
capable of learning concepts in theabsence of any domain knowledge. In addition,
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current explanation-based learning methods assume that the domain theory is
complete, correct, and consistent This same assumption cannot be made about the
prior knowledge of human subjects (Nisbett &Ross, 1978).
Many have argued (e.g., Flann &Dietterich, 1989; Lebowitz, 1986; Pazzani,
1990) that acomplete model ofconcept learning must have both an empirical and an
explanation-based component. Prior empirical studies (e.g., Baisalou, 1985;
Nakamura, 1985; Wattenmaker, Dewey, Muiphy, &Medin, 1986) together with the
experiments reported here, provide constraints on how these learning methods may be
combmed. After the first experiment in this paper, anovel model for combining the
two learning methods is proposed. Next, simulations of tire model are used to make
predictions about the learning rates and biases. Next, these predictions are tested with
expenments on human subjects. Where necessary, revisions to the model are proposed
to account for differences between prediction and observaticms.
Nakamura (1985) investigated the role that prior knowledge has on the accuracy of
classification learning. In particular, he analyzed the interaction between learning
linearly separable and nonlineariy separable concepts and the type of instructions
provided to subjects. One set of instructions was neutral in that it asked the subjects to
correctly classify stimuli (descriptions of flowers). Asecond set of instructions gave
subjects abackground theory that helped with the task (e.g., one class of flowers
attracts birds and that the birds cannot see color and are active at night.) The linearly
separable task resulted in fewer errors during learning using theory instructions than
under neutral instructions. This pattern was reversed for the nonUneariy separable
task: neutral instructions led to fewer errors than theory instructions. One explanation
for this finding is that the concept with the fewest violations ofprior knowledge is
easer for subjects to learn. Such aviolation occurs when asubject is given feedback
that contradicts prior knowledge (e.g., aflower which blooms during the day only
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attracts a bird that is active at night). In this experiment, die linearly separable concept
in this experiment requiredfewer violationsof the prior knowledge than the
nonlineariyseparableconcept This explanationis also supportedby later studies
(Fazzani & Silverstein, 1990, Wattenmaker et al., 1986) suggesting that a nonlineariy
separable concept consistent with priorknowledge is easierto leamthana linearly
separableconcept that violatesprior knowledge.
In thispaper, 1compare thelearning rates of simple conjunctive anddisjunctive
concepts. Note tiiat both oftiiese classes ofconcepts are linearly separable. Therefore,
theexperiments will testwhether theeffect of prior knowledge is more pervasive than
thatsuggested byprevious work that studied the role of priorkrxrwledge in leamrng
linearly separable and nordinearly separable concepts.
Experiment 1
Allof the experiments in this article use a similar method to investigate die effect
of priorknowledge on concept acquisition. One group of subjects performs a standard
concept acquisition experiment. This group of subjects mustdetermine whether each
stimuliis an exampleof an"alpha." The stimuliare photographs of a persondoing
something with a balloon. The stimuli differ in terms of the color of the balloon
(yellow or pur^e), the sizeof the balloon (small or large), the ageof the person(adult
or child), and the action the person is doing (stretching the balloonor dipping the
balloonin water). Existing knowledge aboutinflating balloons is irrelevant for this
group of subjects. Another group of subjects usesthe same stimuli. However, the
instructions indicate the subject mustpredictwhether the balloon willbe inflated when
theperson blows into it In this condition, called the inflate condition, the prior
knowledge of the subject may provide expectations about likely hypotteses. The goal
of the experiments is todetermine conditions under which these expectations facilitate
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or hinder the concept acquisition task.
The purpose of the first experiment was to investigate the interaction between
prior knowledge and the acquisition of conjunctive and disjunctive concepts. The
experiment follows a 2 concept form (conjunctive vs. disjunctive) ^ 2 instruction set
(alpha vs. inflate) between-subjects design.
The conjunction to be learned was "size = small and color = yellow." The
disjunction to be learned was "age = adult or action = stretchinga balloon." Note that
with the inflate instructions, the conjunctive concept is not implied by prior
knowledge while the disjtmctive concept is implied by this knowledge. It is also
important tostress that the prior background knowledge^ (e.g., adults are stronger than
children and stretching a balloon makes it easier to inflate) is not sufficient for subjects
to deduce the correct relationship in the absence of any data. There are several
possible consistent relationships including a conjunctive one (adults can only inflate
balloons that have been stretched) and the disjtmctive relationship tested in this
experiment Experiment 2 will test whether prior knowledge also facilitates a
conjimctive concept consistent with prior knowledge.
The following three predictions were made about the outcome of this experiment
First subjects in the alpha conjunction category are predicted to take fewer trials than
subjects in the alpha disjimction category. In the absence of prior knowledge, it was
anticipated that the data would replicate the finding that conjunctions are easier to learn
than disjunctions. Second, subjects in the inflate disjunction category are predicted to
take fewer trials than those in the inflate conjunction category. It is anticipated that
the influence of prior knowledge would dominate the influence of logical form. Third,
subjects in the inflate disjunction category are predicted to take fewer trials than those
in the alpha disjunction category. Prior knowledge can be expected to facilitate
learning only with the inflate instructions. The rationale here is that there are fewer
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hypotheses consistent with both prior knowledge and the data than those ctmsistent
with the data alone. Therefore, it is anticipated that fewer trials would be needed to
rule out alternatives when the prior knowledge of the subjea is applicable in the
learning task.
Method
Subjects. The subjectswere 88 male and female undergraduates attendingthe
University of California, Irvine who participated in this experimentto receive extra
credit in an introductorypsychology course. Each subject was tested individually.
Subjects were randomlyassigned to one of the four conditions.
.Stimuli. TTre stimuli consisted of pages from a photo album. Each page contained
a close-up{dtotograph of a balloonwhichvaried in color (yellow or purple) and size
(smallor large) and a [diotograi^ of a person (either an adultor a S year-oldchild)
doing something to the balloon (either dipping it in water or stretchingit). For the
inflate subjects, the back of the page of the (dK>to album had a picture of the person
with a balloon that had been inflated or a balloon that had not been inflated. For the
alpha subjects, a card with the words"Alpha" or "Not Alpha" was on the reverse side
of each page. Because there are four attributes that can take on two values, there are a
total of 16 unique stimuli. Of these stimuli, 12 are positive examples of a disjunction
of two attributes and 4 are positive examples of a conjunction of two attributes.
Haygood and Bourne (1965) reconunend duplicating stimuli to insure roughly equal
numbers of positive or negative examples due to the effect of die proportion of
positive examples on learning rates (Hovland & Weiss, 1953). The 4 negative
examples of the disjimction were duplicated in the disjunctionconditions and the 4
positive examples wereduplicated in the conjunction conditions to produce a totalof
20 stimuli in all conditions.
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The set of stimuli used in the conjunction conditions follow the rule "size = small
and color = yellow." In the conjunctive condition, one positiveexample was a
photograph of a child stretching a small yellow balloon. One negative example was a
photogr^h of anadult stretching a large yellow balloon. The stimuli in thedisjunction
conditions follow the rule"age = adultor action = stretching." In the disjunctive
condition, one positive example was a photograph of a child stretching a large yellow
balloon. One negative example was a photograph of a child dipping a small yellow
balloon in water.
Prcx:edures. Subjects read either the alpha or inflate instructions. Both sets of
instructions mention thatthephotographs differed in only fouraspects (the size and
colorof theballoon, the age of the actor, and the action the actor was performing). The
alpha and inflate instructions differed only inone line ("predict whether the page is an
example of an 'alpha' " asopposed to"predia whether the balloon will beinflated").
Subjects were shown a page from the photo album and asked tomake a prediction.
Then, thepage was turned overandtlw subjett saw the correct prediction. Next, the
subject was presented with arrother card. This process was repeated until thesubjects
were able to predict correctly on sixconsecutive trials. Thenumber of thelast trial on
which the subject made anerrorwas recorded. The pages were presented in a random
order, subject to the constraint that the first page was always a positive example. If the
subject exhausted aU twenty pages, thepages were shuffled and thetrairung was
repeated until the subject responded properly onsix consecutive trials oruntil fifty
pages were presented. If the subject did not obtain the correct answer after fifty trials,
the last error is considered to have been made on trial fifty.
Note thatsubjects in thealpha disjunction and inflate disjunction conditions see
theexactsame stimuli. Theonlydifference is onelinein the instructions andthe
nature of thefeedback (the words "Alpha" or"NotAlpha" asopposed toa photograph
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of an inflated or uninflated balloon). Similarly, the subjects in the alpha conjunction
and inflate conjunction conditions see the exact same stimuli.
Results
The results of'this experiment (see Figure 1)confirmed the predictions. Rgure 1
illustrates that the learning task is influenced by prior theory. This effect is sostrong
thatit dominates the well-known finding thatconjunctive concepts areeasierto learn
than disjunctive concepts. The interaction between the learning task and the logical
form ofthe concept tobeacquired is significant atthe .01 level£(1.84) = 22.07, MSg
= 264.0. However, neither main effea is significant
PLACE HGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Analysis of the data with the Tukey HSD testconfirmed the three predictions. The
results aresignificant at the .05 level (C.diff = 11.8). First, subjects in theal^iha
conjunction oMidition required significantly fewer trials than those in the alpha
disjimction category (18.0 vs. 30.8). Sectmd, the inflate disjunction subjects required
significantly fewer trials than the inflate conjunction subjects (9.4 vs. 29.1). Third, the
infiafp. disjunction subjects required significantly fewer trials thanthe alpha
disjunction subjects (9.4 vs. 30.8).
Discussion
The findings provide support for the hypothesis thatconcepts consistent with
priorknowledge require fewer examples to leamaccurately than concepts thatare not
consistent with prior knowledge. Theresult is especially important because it
demonstrates that prior knowledge dominates the commordy accepted finding that
disjunctive concepts are more difficult to leam than conjunctive concepts. Cue
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salience (Bower & Trabasso, 1968) cannot account for the finding that subjects who
read the inflate instructions found disjunctions easier than conjunctions. Otherwise,
subjects who read the alpha instructions would be expected to exhibit similar
preferences. This experiment raises important issues for empirical learning methods,
including neural networic models (Rumelhart, Hinton, & 'Wfllliams, 1986). The
learning rules of purely empirical methods do not take the prior knowledge of the
learner into account Any difference in learning rates between subjects who read the
inflate instructions and those who read the alpha instructions must be accoimted for by
a difference in the nature of the prior knowledge that can be applied to the task.
The experiment also points out inadequacies of current explanation-based learning
methods. EEL assumes that the background theory is sufficiently strong to prove why
a particular outcome occurred. Purely explanation-based approaches to learning
predict that subjects would be ctqrable of learning from a single example. This single
trial learning merely summarizes a deductive proof based upon the backgroimd
knowledge of the subjects. In contrast, it does not t^pear that the backgroimd
knowledge of the subjects is sufficiently strong to create such a proof. Instead, the
background knowledge of die subjects seems to be able to identify what factors of the
simation might influence the outcome of an attempt to inflate a balloon. However,
subjects needed several examples to determine which of these factors were relevant
and whether the factors were r^cessary or sufficienL
In the next section, a method of combining empirical and explanation-based
learning is introduced that makes use of this weaker sort of domain knowledge
represented as an influerx:e theory. A simple computational model capable of
explaining the learning rates observed in Experiment 1 is proposed. Next, additional
simulations are run under a variety of different conditions. Additional experiments
will be described that test the predictions made by the model.
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Explanation-based learning with an itifluence dieory
In order to developa computation modelof the learningtask, the assumption of
explanation-based learning that the domain theory becomplete and correct must be
relaxed. Thefull incomplete andincorrect domain theory problem inexplanation-based
learning (Rajamoney &DeJong, 1987) is not addressed. Instead, I consider an
influence theory, a particular tvtx of incomplete theory. In such a theory, the
influence of several factors is known, but the domain theory does not specify a
systematic means ofcombining the factors. Inaddition, it isrrat assumed that the
domain theory identifies all of the influential factors. Loosening these constraints on
thedomain theory allows prior knowledge tobemore widely applicable. Inparticular,
it is necessary to relax these constraints to model the type ofprior knowledge used by
the subjects in Experiment I.
PosTHoc uses an influencetheory to proposehypothesesthat are then tested
against further data. The influence theory is also used to revise hypotheses that fail to
make accurate predictions. POSTHoc is also capable of performing classification tasks
for which its background knowledge is irrelevant
Representation of training and test examples
Anexample in POSTHOC consists of a setof attributes and a classification. Each
attribute is a pairof anattribute name (e.g., age) and anattribute value (e.g., adult). A
classification can be diought of as an outcome (e.g.,inflate) or category membership
information (e.g., ali^). For example, anadult successfully inflating a small yellow
balloon that had been stretched is represented as:
size=small color^yellow age=adult act=stretch e inflate
and a large purple balloon that had been dipped inwater bya child that is not an
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example of an ali^ is represented as:
size=large color^purple age=child aa=dip e alpha
Representation and use of hvmotheses
POSTHOC maintains a single hypothesis consisting of a disjunctive nonnal form
description (i.e., disjunction of conjtmctions) of a ctmcept and a prediction. For
example, the following represents the hypothesis that a child can inflate a stretched
balloon or an adult can inflate any balloon:
(age=childA act=stretch) v age=adult-> inflate
Note that to avoid confusion, die symbol -* is used in hypotheses, while e is used
to denote that an instance is a member of a class.
Influence theories
An influence theory consists of two components. First, it has a set of influences.
An influence consists of an influence type (either easier or harder), an outcome (e.g.,
inflate), and a factor that influences the outcome (e.g., more-elastic). Second, an
influence theory has a set of inference rules that describe when an influence is present
in an example.
To simulate the knowledge of subjects in the previous experiment, tte two
influences in Table 1 are used. These influences state that it is easier for a strong actor
to inflate a balloon and that it is easier to inflate a more elastic balloon.
PLACE TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
The inference rules determine when an influence is present in a training example.
The inference rules used to simulate the knowledge of the subjects are also shown in
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Table 1. These rules state that stretching an object makes the objea more elastic; that
older actors tend to be stronger actors; and that adults are old.
Note that the attributes used to represent the training examples are the only
attributes that are permitted in the hypotheses. The influence theory can be used to
generate a hypothesis, but a factorof the influence tl^ry cannotbe used as an attribute
in a hypothesis. Rather, the learning procedure may suggest including thoseattributes
of trainingexamples whosepresence indicatesthe presence of a factor from the
influence theory.
The learning task
POSTHoc is an incremental learning model that maintains a single hypothesis
(Levine, 1966,1967). The current hypothesis is revised wily when it makes an
incorrect classification. The learning task is sununarized as follows:
Given: A set of training examples
An influence theory (optional)
Create: A hypothesis that classifies examples.
The influence theory is optional because the learning system must cerate when
there is no prior knowledge, or when the prior knowledge does not apply to the current
learning task.
PostHoc is intended to model the interaction between prior knowledge and
logical form by accounting qualitatively for differences in human learning rates and
differences in human hypothesis selection biases on different tasks. The model is
designed to predictthat one learning task requires significantly more trialsthan another
task as a function of the prior knowledge and logical form of the hypothesis. Although
it does make quantitative predictions on the numberof trainingexamples, POSTHOC is
evaluatedonly on its abilityto partiallyorder the difficulty of learningtasks.
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PostHoc is intended as the simplest representative of a class of models that can
account for how prior knowledge constrains the learning process. POSTHOC is not
intended as a complete model of the tasks because it does not make use of additional
infoimation that human learners have (e.g., perceptual salience of cues (Bower &
Trabasso, 1968)). Furthermore, each training example in PosTHoc is represented as
a set of potentially relevant attributes. Although the instructions in the experiments tell
the subjects whichattributes are potenti^y relevant, the subjects perform an additional
taskby determining the valuesof these attributes from the photograi^. Because
subjects do thisaddition^ task, as wellas perceiving othertasks (e.g., perceiving facial
expressions of the actorin the photographs), POSTHOC is not solvingas complex a
learning task as the subjects. Nonetheless, it is still possiblefor PosTHoc to make
predictions about the relative difficulty of learningtasks because these additional
complications are held constant for each group of subjects.
POSTHOC
POSTHOC is an incremental, hill-climbing model of human learning of the type
advocated in Langley, Gennari, and Iba (1987). POSTHOC is implemented as a simple
production system. When the current hypothesis makes an error (or there is no current
hypothesis), a set of productions produces a new hypothesis. The productions examine
the current hypothesis, the current training example, and the influence theory. There
are three sets of productions. One set creates an initial hypothesis when the first
positive example is encountered. The second production set deals with errors of
omission in which a positive example is falsely classified as a negative example. This
production set makes the hypothesis more general. The final production set deals
with errors of commission in which a negative example is falsely classified as a
positive example. Thisproduction set makes thehypothesis more specific. Within
each production set, theproductions are ordered bypriority.
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PLACE TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
InitializingHvnothesis. Two productionsused to initializea hypothesis are shown
inTable 2. The first production (II) detennines if there areattributes of theexample
thatwould indicate thepresence of a factor thatinfluences theoutcome of a positive
example. This isaccomplished by chaining backward from the influence rules which
indicate that a certainoutcome (e.g.. inflating a balloon) is easierwhen a certainfactor
ispresent. The presence ofa factor is verified by chaining backward to find attribute
values that are indicative of an influential factor. For example, if the initial positive
example is anadult successfully inflating a small yellow balloon that had been
stretched:
color^yellow size=large act=stretch age=adult e inflate
I*ostHocmight try toestablish thatthe strength of theactor is an influential factor.
The factthatstrength is an influential factor canbe estaldished by showing that the
actor is strong. Thefact thatthe actor is strong canbeverified because theexample
inHifiatfts fliat the actot is adulL The initial hypothesis is that adults can inflate
balloons:
age=adult-» inflate
In thisexample, there is more thanoneinfluence present. When thisoccurs, one
infiiiftnrft is selected at random fiom the set of applicable influences. Given die
ballooninfluence theory, an altemadve hypotiiesis is that stretching the balloonresults
in theballotm being inflated. However, rather than keeping track of thealternative
hypotheses, POSTHOC selects one. If this selection turns outtobeincorrect, later
examples will cause errors ofomission orerrors ofcommission and force the revision
of the hypothesis.
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The second production (12) in this set initializes the hypothesis to a conjunction of
the attributes of the first positive example. This occurs if there are no influences
present that would account for theoutcome. This is true formodeling alpha
instructions subjects because thereare no knownfactors that influence whetheror not
something is classified as an alpha.
Errors of Omission. Threeproductions to correct errors of omission are also
shown in Table2. The firstproduction (01) J^lies onlyif the current hypodiesis is
consistentwith the influencetheory and the attributes of the example indicate the
presence of an additional factor. This additional factor is assumed tobeamultiple
sufficient cause (Kelley, 1971). Thenew hypothesis created is a disjunction of the
old hypothesis and a conjunction of the attributes indicative of the additional factor.
For example,if the current hypothesis is:
age=adult-> inflate
and the current training example is:
size=large act=stretch age=child color=yellow e inflate
then the currenthypothesis will cause an eiror of omission because the hypothesis fails
to predict thecorrect outcome. Because there areattributes indicative of an additional
influence (more-elastic), Production 01 will create a new hypodiesis that represents a
multiple sufficient cause:
act=stretch v age=adult -» inflate
The secondproduction (02) is a variantof the wholiststrategy in Bruneret al.,
(1956), that drops a single attribute that differs between the misclassified example and
the hypothesis. In caseof ties,one is selected at random. For example, if the current
hypothesis is:
color=yelIow a size=large a act=dip a age=adult -> inflate
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and the current training example is:
coloi^yeUow size=small act=dip age=adult € inflate
then Production 02 will drop die attribute that differs between the example and the
current hypothesis to form the new hypothesis:
colorsyellow a aa=dip a age=adult -» inflate
The third error of omission production (03) forms a disjunction of the current
hypothesis and a random attribute of the example wten the currenthypodiesis is
consistent with background knowledge and when conjunctive hypotheses have been
ruled out For example, if the current hypothesis is:
(age=child a act=stretch) v size=small -* inflate
and the current training examples is:
colorsyellow size=Iarge act=dip age=child e inflate
then Production 03 will create a new disjunction of die current hypcMhesis and a
randomly selected attribute of the current example:
age=child v (age=child a act=stretch) v size=small inflate
The simplification of the hypothesis affects the form of the hypothesis to make it
more concise and understandable but does not affea the accuracy of the hypothesis. It
consists of several simplification rules (e.g., X v (XaY) • X). For example, the
hypothesis from the previous example may be simplified to:
age=child v size=small inflate
Errors of Commission. Two productions to revise the hypothesis when an error of
commission is detected are shown in Table 2. The first production (Cl) adds a
multiple necessary cause to the hypothesis (Kelley, 1971). For example, if the
hypothesis is that all adults can inflate balloons:
age=adult -> inflate
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an error wiU occur on an example of an adult not inflating a large yellow balloon that
has been dipped in water
size=large color=yeUow act=dip age=adult e inflate
The hypothesis is modified by finding an additional factor not present in the
example thatcould affea theoutcome (e.g., stretching the balloon) andasserting that
the attributes indicative of this factor are necessary to inflate the balloon. The new
hypothesis consists of a single conjimction representing the prediction that adults can
only inflate balloons that have been stretched:
act=stretch a age=adult -* inflate
The second error of commission production (C2) specializes a hypothesis by
addingadditionalattributes to each true conjunct. For example, if the current
hypothesis is that yellow balloonsor purpleballoonsthat had been dipped in water can
be inflated:
colors yellow v (coloispurple a aa=dip) inflate
and the following example is encountered:
size=small color=yellow age= child act^dip e inflate
then an incorrect prediction will be made because color=yellow is true. This
hypothesis is modified by finding the inverse of an attribute of the example(e.g., size)
and asserting that this is necessary when the color is yellow:
(color=yellowASize=lai:ge)v(color=purpleAact=dip)-♦ inflate
If this change turns out to be incorrect,later exampleswill force further refinementof
the hypothesis.
An example of POSTHOC acquiring a predictive rule will help to clarify how
hypothesesare formed and revised. Here, I considerhow POSTHOC operates with an
incomplete theory. In this incomplete theory, there is ordyone influence present:
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(easier more-elastic inflate)
and the data presented to POSTHoc are consistent with the nile that adults can inflate
any balloonor anyone can inflatea balloonthat has been stretched:
age=adult v act=stretch —> inflate
This example will illustrate how boththe analytical and empirical components
cooperate tocreate a,hypothesis. The first example is an example ofa balloon being
inflated:
color=puiple size=small act=stretch age=child € inflate
Production II finds an influence present and the initial hypothesis is that all
balloons that have been stretched can be inflated:
act=stretch -» inflate
This hypothesis is consistent withseveral moreexamples. Rnally, an errorof omis
sion occurs when PosTHOC predicts that a balloon will not be inflated,but it is:
color=yeIlow size=large act=dip age=adult € inflate
Production 03 randomly selectsone attribute and makesa new disjunction of the old
hypothesis and the attribute. This attribute is dippingthe balloonin water. The new
hypothesis states that stretching a balloon or dipping a balloon in waterare predictive
of the balloon being inflated:
act=stretch v act=dip -* inflate
This hypothesis causes an error of cotrunission when an example is erroneously
predicted to result in a successful inflation of a balloon:
colon=yellow size=small act=dip ageschild e inflate
Production C2 specializesthe term of the disjunctionthat indicates that dipping a
balloon in water is predictive of the balloonbeing inflated. The inverse of the age is
selected as an additional necessary condition for this conjunct The newhypothesis is:
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(age=adulta aa=dip) v act=stretch inflate
This hypothesisis consistentwith the rest of the trainingset becauseonly two
kinds of actions are present in these data.
Simulation 1
POSTHoc was run on each of the four conditions from Experiment 1. Like
Experiment 1, this simulation follows a 2 concept form (conjunction vs. disjunctive) x
2 instruction set (alpha vs. inflate) between-subjects desigmThe simulations wererun
in Common Lisp on an Apple Macintosh n computer. The stimuli andprocedures
described for Experiment 1 were adapted as necessary to accountfor the difference
between a computer andhuman "subjects." Training examples were prepared by
defining fourattributes for eachpageof the j^to album. The balloon influence theory
displayed inTable 1 is used to represent thepriorknowledge of the subjects who read
the inflate instructions. No influence dieory was used when modeling tte alpha
conditions. No change to POSTHOC is necessary to model the ali^ conditicms.
However, since the information needed by the productions that make use of the
influence is not present, none of these productions wiU be used.
POSTHOC was run 2(X) times on different random orders of training examples for
each of the four conditions. As in Experiment 1, POSTHOC was run untU six
consecutive examples were classified correctly. The last trial on which PosTHOc
made an error was recorded for each simulation. Both the ordering of examples and
the alternative attributes randtxnlyselectedby the [xxxiuctions accountfor differences
in training times in different simulations of the same condition.
The Influence of Prior Knowledge
22
Results
The results of this simulation are similar to those of Experiment 1. The interaction
between the learning task and the logical form of the coiK:ept to be acquired is
significant atthe .01 level£(1.793) = 132.9, Ms^ =78.4. Analysis of the data with
the Tukey HSD test confirms the same three predictions from Experiment 1. The
results are significantat the .01 level (C.diff = 2.7). First, the alpha conjunction
category required significantly fewertrialsthan the alpha disjimction category (6.85
vs. 18.80). Second, the inflate disjunction category required significantly fewer trials
than the inflate conjunctioncategory (3.97 vs. 16.52). Third, the inflate disjunction
category required significantly fewer trials than the alpha disjunction category(3.97
vs. 18.80).
Discussion
Inconsistent conjunctive concepts (e.g., the inflate conjtmction condition) are more
difficult for POSTHOC to acquire than conjunctive concepts without an influence theory
(e.g., the alpha conjunctioncondition)because the initial hypothesistypically includes
irrelevant attributes (e.g., age=adult) predicted to be relevant by the influence theory.
These irrelevant attributes must be dropped from the hypotlwsis when they cause
errors.
Simulation 1 demonstrates that POSTHOC can account for the differences in
learning rates in Experiment 1 as a function of the logical form of the concept and the
existenceof relevantprior knowledge. Next, four more simulations are presented that
make predictions about learningrates of human subjects, the type of stimulus
information that subjectsprocessduringlearning, the typesof hypotheses that subjects
create and the effect of incompleteand incorrect Imowledge on learning rates. These
simulationsare followedby experimentsin which the predictions of POSTHOC are
tested on human subjects.
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Simulation 2
Experiment 1 and Simulation 1 demonstrate that relevant background knowledge
makes a consistent disjtmctive concept easier to learn than the same disjunctive
concept when nobackground knowledge is relevant In this next simulation, the
learning rate of POSTHOC on a consistent conjunctive concept is compared to the
learning rate ontiie identical conjunctive cortcept when nobackground knowledge is
relevant. The stimuli in the experiment follow tte rule, "age = adultand action=
stretching" (i.e., adults can only inflate balloons that have been stretched). ^ in
Simulation 1, there are sixteen unique stimuli and a totalof twenty training examples
were constructed byduplicating thefour positive examples. POSTHOC is run with the
influence theory inTable 1 andwithno influence theory. Onehundred random orders
of training examples were simulated in eachof theconditions. Asin Simulation 1,
PostHOC was run until 6 consecutive examples were classified correctly and the last
trial on which an error was made was recorded.
Results and Discussion
In this simulation, the conjunctive conceptwas learnedmore qtuckly when the
relevant influence theory is present (3.6vs. 5.5, K198) = 8.42, 0.328, .01).
This simulation clearlydemorrstrates that prior knowledge can facilitate the learning
of more than one logical form. Furthermore, the fact that the same influencetheory
was used in both simulations shows that more than one concept can be consistent with
the sameinfluence theory. In Simulation 1, the ballooninfluence theoryin Table 1
was shown to facilitate learning the disjtmctive rule "age = adult or action =
stretching." Here, thissame knowledge facilitated learning the conjunctive rule "age=
adult and action = stretching." Thedomain theory usedby priorwork in explanation-
based learning cannot exhibit this flexibility because both ofthese concepts cannot be
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in the deductive closure of the same domain theory. However, the influence theory
used by POSTHOC allows it to use prior knowledge to facilitate learning either concept
Note that in Simulation 1, the influence theory hindered learning a ctmjunctive
concept while the same influencetheory facilitated learning a conjunctive concept in
Simulation 2. The difference is that in Simulation 1, the conjunctive concept "size =
small and color = yellow" was not consistent with the influence theory, but in
Simulation 2, the conjunctive concept "age = adult and action = stretching" was
consistent.
In POSTHOC, ttiere are three types of relationships between a concept and the
backgroundknowledge. First, the backgroimd knowledgecan be neutral in that it does
not provide support for any hypothesis. This occurs when the influencetheory
contains no influences for tl^ concept being leamed (e.g., the ali^ conditions of
Simulation 1). In diis case, PosTHoc uses only those productions that do not require
an influence theory (12,02,03 and C2). Second, the concept to be leamed may be
consistent with the background knowledge. In this case, POSTHOC uses tmly those
productionsthat refer to tte influencetheory (II, 01, Cl). Finally, the concept to be
leamed may be inconsistent with the background knowledge. When diis is true, an
initial subset of the training examples may be consistent. Therefore, POSTHOC may
start to use productions that make use of the influence theory. The hypotheses formed
by these productions will be inconsistent with later examples, and POSTHOC will
eventually resort to those productions that do not reference the influence theory.
Figure 2 shows the average numberof times (H.= 100)each production was used
whenlearning a disjunctive and conjunctive concept for eachof the three relationships.
In each case, the concept had two relevant attributesand two irrelevant attributes. Note
that the neutral and consistent cases use only a subset of the productions, while the
inconsistent case requires all productions.
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PLACE FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Simulation 3
Simulation 3 is designed to help to explainwhy POSTHOC requires fewer
examples to learn when hypotheses are consistent with an influence theory. Theclaim
tested is that when there is correctprior Iqiowledge, a smallerhypothesisspace is
searched. In this situation,PosTHoc can ignore irrelevantattributes(i.e., attributes
not indicative of known influences). Simulation 3 investigates which attributes are
considered whencategorizing examples. It is assumed that every attribute that is in the
current hypothesis is considered during categorization. In addition, there is a sampling
probability thatthean attribute notit thecurrent hypothesis will beconsidered. It is
also assumed that after a categorization error is made,all attributes are considered
when forming a new hypothesis. There aretworeasons forconsidering attributes not
partof thehypothesis during categorization. First, in a similar experiment using
human subjects (Experiment 3), subjects reported looking at some attributes outof
curiosity. Second, occasionally considering attributes not in the hypothesis introduces
somevariability in POSTHOC andenables analyses of the data. In three simulations,
values of 0.1,0.5, and 0.9 were used as the probability that an attribute not in the
hypothesis will be considered by POSTHOC during classification.
The hypodiesistested is that POSTHOC will considerfewer irrelevantattributes
when there is an influence theory (and when the data are consistent with the influence)
than when there is no influence theory. On each trial, starting with the second trial, the
proportion of irrelevant attributes considered is recorded. This proportion is calculated
bydividing the number of irrelevant attributes considered bythe total number of
attributesconsidered. Note that with a correct influencetheory, an irrelevantattribute
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is considered only because there is a sampling probability that an attribute not in the
hypothesis is considered. Without an influence theory, an irrelevant attribute can be
considered because it spears in a hypothesis or because the attribute is sampled
randomly.
The disjimctive concept "age = adult or action = stretching" is tested both with
and widiout an influence theory. One himdred trials of each condition are nm for each
level of sampling (i.e., 0.1,0.5 and 0.9). Twenty training examples are generated in
the same manner as the disjunctive conditions of Simulation 1. However, in the
current simulations, the same randomly selected order is used for every simulation.
This is done to eliminate the effect diat the ordering of training examples has on the
creation and revision of hypotheses. The exaa same order of examples was also used
in Experiment 3.
Each simulation follows a 2 x 19 mixed design with one between-subjects factor
(Knowledge State- no influence theory vs. consistent influence theory) and one within-
subjects factor (Trial- number of the learning trial ranging from 2 to 20). On each trial,
the proportion of irrelevant attributes was measured.
Results and Discussion
Figure 3 shows the results of the three simulations, with one panel showing the
result for each sampling probability. When there was a consistent influence theory, the
proportion of irrelevant attributes was less than or equal to the proportion of irrelevant
attributes with no influence theory. When there was no influence theory, the mean
proportion of irrelevant attributes always started at 0.5 and over the 20 trials declined
to varying degrees depending on the sampling probability. With the influence theory
(i.e., the inflate instructions), no irrelevant attributes are in any hypothesis and the
proportionof irrelevantattributes considered is equal to the proportion of irrelevant
attributes selected randomly. Without the influencetheory (i.e., the alpha instructions).
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the proportion of irrelevant features considered (Alpha Total) is the sum of the
irrelevant features in the hypothesis (Alpha Hyp) and the irrelevant features selected
randomly (Ali^a Rand).
An arcsine transformation was applied to the proportion data and an analysis of
variance shows that, as expected,there is a main effect for Knowledge State,£(1,198)
=288.22, Ms^ =179.4, ji< .0(X)1. In addition, the main effect ofTrial was
significant £(18,3564) = 2.19, Ms^ = 0.65, £.< .01.
Figure 3 also plots data when the probability of considering a feature not in the
hypothesis is 0.1 (upper) and and 0.9 (lower). As this probability approaches 1, the
total proportion of irrelevant attributes that PostHoc considers when it simulates
infiatpi instructions approaches the proportion of irrelevant attributes that it considers
when it simulates a^ha instructions. However, even when this probability is 0.9,
there isa main effect for Knowledge State,£(1,198) = 59.08, Ms^ =2.60, J2.< .0001.
This simulation shows that PostHoc can ignore irrelevant attributes when
hypotheses are consistent with the influence theory. The ability of human leamers to
ignore irrelevant attributes will be tested in Experiment 3.
PLACE HGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
Simulation 4
Simulations 1 and 2 show that PostHoc learns more rapidly when hypotheses are
consistent with its influence theory. Simulation 3 helps to explain this finding by
demonstrating that PostHoc need not attend to some attributes during leaming when
hypotheses are consistent with its influence theory.
In this simulation, I elaborate on this finding by demonstrating that the prior
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knowledge of POSTHoc also affects the hypotheses it forms. In particular, whenever
possible, a hypothesis will only include attributes indicative of factors in the influence
theory. This simulation is a variation of the redimdant relevant cue experiments
(Bower & Trabasso, 1968). In a redundant relevant cue experiment, at training time, a
subject performs a classification task in which the data are consistent with more dian
one hypothesis. For example, in this simulation the balloon that is dipped in water is
always purple and a balloon that is stretched is always yellow. The yellow stretched
balloons are the balloons that receive positive feedback (i.e., can be inflated or are an
instance of alpha). There are multiple hypotheses consistent with die data (e.g., all
yellow balloons are instances of alpha, or all stretched ballotxis are instances of alpha).
A total of eight such training examples are constructed. After the system is able to
perform accurately on six consecutive examples, the hypothesis created by the system
is recorded. The hypotheses created by POSTHCX: with the influence theory in Table 1
are compared to those produced by POSTHOC on the same training set without an
influence theory. Two hundred simulations of each condition were run widi training
examples in randomly selected orders.
Results and Discussion
An analysis of POSTHOC productimis indicates that widi an influence theory,
PosTHoc will always create the hypothesis "aa=stretch -* inflate". Without the
influence theory, the hypothesis "(color=yellow a act=stretch) -»aljdia" will always
be created. This analysis was substantiated by the simulation in which it was found
that with an influence theory, the only relevant variable used was the action. Without
an influence theory, both color and the action are in the final hypothesis.
Botii hypotheses created by POSTHOC are consistent with the data. However, the
hypothesis will also be consistent with the influerx^e theory if one is ai^licable. The
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results of the simulation without an influence theory differ from the findings of
redundantrelevantcue experiments on human subjects. Most subjectsin the Bower
and Trabasso (1968)experimentfavored one attribute discriminatiwis (i.e., either
"color = yellow" or "action = stretched") to conjunctions.
An examination of PostHoc's productions reveals that the only meansof learning
one attribute discriminations is by droppingan attributefrom a conjunctionof two
attributes. An extension to POSTHoc to more faithfully model the empirical findings
would contain an additional initializationproduction to create one attribute
discriminations. This extension has not yet been implemented because the focus of
POSTHOC has been to account for the influence of a particular type of prior knowledge
on learning.
Simulation S
Here, 1explore the influeiKe of thecompleteness and correctness of the influence
theory on the learning rate. POSTHOC was runwith five variations of theballoon
influence theory: consistent (thecomplete andcorrect influence theory consisting of
two influences), incomplete (oneof the twoinfluences wasdeleted from the complete
theory), neutral (the entire influence theory was deleted), partially inconsistent (the
influence theory consisted of onecorrect andoneincorrect influence— yellow balloons
are easier to inflate), and inconsistent(two incorrect influenceswere used). The goal
of learning in each condition is to acquire the rule thatadults caninflate any balloon or
anyone can inflate a balloon that has been stretched. Each condition was run 128 times
and the number of the last trial on which PosTHOc misclassified an example was
recorded.
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Results and Discussion
In order, the mean number of trials required to converge on an accurate hypothesis
for the consistent, incomplete, neutral, partially inconsistent, and inconsistent
conditions are 3.9,12.8,18.4,15.1, and 20.1. The quality of the domain theory has a
significant effecton the numberof trials required to acquire an accurate concept
iH4.635) = 72.2, = 100.7).
When there is no influence theory, only the empirical iHXxluctions of POSTHoc are
used to foim a hypothesis. When there is an incompleteinfluencetheory, the empirical
and analytical productions cooperate to produce a hypothesis. When there is a
complete influence theory, only the analytical productions are used. With the incorrect
influence theory, the analytical productiotis usually create inconea hypotheses that are
revised by the empirical hypotheses. The analytical productions are not tised if the
initial examples are not consistent with the incorrea influence theory. For example, if
the first positive training example contains a large pur^deballoon, dien there is no
initial hypothesis consistent with the influence theory and an empirical production
initializes the hypotheses. The inconsistent theory is the most difficult, because the
initial hypothesis often involves irrelevant features that must later be deleted.
The most interesting result of this simulation is that POSTHOC with the partially
inconsistent theory 15.1) takes fewer trials than PostHoc with no theory (M =
18.4). Analysis of the data with the Tukey HSD reveals that the difference in learning
rates is significant (C.diff = 3.2, £. <. 01). The difference between these two
conditions is partially accounted for by the fact that it is more likely that the correct
rather than incorrect influence will be chosen to initialize the hypothesis because the
correct influence is present in more of the positive examples(100%)than the incorrect
influence (50%). As a result, in 75% of the cases, the hypothesis will be initialized
correctly with an inconsistent theory.
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Experiment 2
In Simulations 2,3 and 4, several emergent properties of PosTHOC's learning
algorithm weredescribed. The following threeexperiments assess whethersimilar
phenomenon are true of human learning. Theeffects of priorknowledge (hi learning
rates, relevance of attributes, and hypothesis selectionare measured in Experiments 2,
3 and 4, respectively.
One resultof Experiment 1 is that consistent disjunctive concepts (the inflate
disjunction condition) letiuired fewer trials to leamthanneutral disjunctive concepts
(thealpha disjunction condition). A second result of Experiment 1 wasthat
inconsistent conjunctive concepts (the inflateconjunction condition) required more
trials than neutral conjunctive concepts (the alpha conjunctivecondition).
In Experiment 2, thectHijunctive concept tested is consistent withthe subjects*
priorknowledge (age= adultand action = stretching). The learning rateof this
consistentconjunctiveconcept is comparedto the learning rate of the same ctmjunctive
concept with neutral instructions. The design of Experiment2 parallels the design of
Simulation 2.
Experiment 2 has several goals. First, a prediction made by POSTHOC is tested. In
particular. Simulation 2 showed that consistent conjunctive concepts require fewer
trials than neutral conjuiuHive (x>ncepts. Second, it is hoped that Experiment 2 will
showthat the subjects' background knowledge provides weakconstraints on learning
similarto thoseprovidedby P0STH(x:'s influence theory. In particular. Experiment 1
assumesthe disjunctiveconcept (age = adultor acticm = stretching)is (X)nsistent with
background knowledge, while Experiment 2 assumes that the ccmjuncHive (xrncept (age
= adult and action= stretching) is consistent Qearly, these both cannotbe deduced
from the typeof background knowledge required by explanation-based learning.
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However, both are consistent with the the influence theory of EBL.
Experiment 2will also serve to rule out an alternative explanation^ for the results
of Experiment 1. In particular, it is possible that there is sometiiing about the inflate
instructions (but not the alpha instmctions) that leads subjects to predict when a
balloon will not be inflated. The interpretation of the results of Experiment 1 assumed
that the hypothesis learnedby subjects can be represented as "if the actor is an adult or
the actionis stretching a balloon, then die balloonwill be inflated." However, this rule
is logically equivalent to "if the actoris a childand the action is dipping a balloonin
water, then the balloon will not be inflated." If this is dvecase, then prior knowledge
is irrelevant and the results of Experiment 1 simply indicate that disjunctive concepts
are harder to learn than conjunctive concepts. However, if this is the case, one would
expect to find that subjects readingdie inflate instructions and learning a consistent
conjunction (age = adult and act = stretching) would require more trials than subjects
reading the alpha instructions and learning a neutral conjunction. This would occur
because die inflate instructions would presumedly lead subjects to learn when a
balloon was not inflated. In this case, the rule indicating that a balloon is not inflated is
a disjunction: (age = child or act = dipping).
Method
Subjects. The subjects were 54 undergraduates attending the University of
California, Irvine who participated in this experiment to receive extra credit in an
introductorypsychologycourse. Subjects were randomly assignedto one of two
conditions (al^dia or inflate).
Stimuli. The stimuli consistedof pages from a i^to album identical to those of
Experiment 1.Eachpage contained a close-up photograidi of a balloon which varied
in color and size and a photograph of a persondoing something to the balloon.
However, subjects now received positive feedback if the actoris an adultand tte
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action is stretching a balloon. The set of stimuli used in the conjunction conditions
follow the rule "size = small and color = yellow." One positive example was
photograph of a child stretching a small yellow balloon. One negative example was a
photogr^h of an adult stretching a large yellow balloon. A total of 20 stimuli were
constructed by duplicating the four positive examples.
Procedures. The procedure was identical to Experiment 1. The instructions read
by the two groups differed in only one line ("predia whether the page is an example
of an 'alpha' " as opposed to "predia whether the balloon will be inflated"). The
number of the last trial on which the subjea made an error was recorded.
Results and Discussion
Subjects in the inflate condition learned the concept more rapidly than subjects in
the alpha condition (8.9 vs. 13.8, i(52) = 2.09, = 2.39, ji< .05).
This experiment provides additional support for tire hypotheses that consistency
with prior knowledge is a significant influence on the rate of concept acquisition. The
experiment also points out that the prior knowledge of the subjects can be used to
facilitate the learning of several different hypotheses. This demonstrates that the prior
knowledge of subjects is more flexible than the domain theory used by EBL. Two
different hypotheses carmot be deduced from the domain theory of EBL, but can be
consistent with the influence theory ofPOSTHOC. For example, tiie same influence
theory enables PosTHoc to model the relative difficulty of learning in Experiments 1
and 2.
Experiment 3
In Simulation 3, it was shown that with a correa influence theory, PosiHoc
ignores irrelevant attributes. However, when the influence theory is missing.
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POSTHoc initially forms a hypothesis that iiKludes these irrelevantattributes and then
later revises the hypothesis by removing the irrelevant attributes when examples are
misclassified.
The goal of this experiment is to test the hypothesis that subjects learninga
concept consistent with their background knowledge will attend to a smaller proportion
of irrelevant attributesthan subjects learning the identical concept in a context in
which their prior knowledge is irrelevant.
It is a relatively simple matter to determine which attributes POSTHOC is ignoring
during learning. To test this hypothesis on human subjects, different stimuli and
procedures were usedthanin theearlier experiments. Experiment 3 usesverbal
descriptionsof actions instead of photographsfor the stimuli. A program was
constructed for an Apple Macintosh n computer to display the verbaldescriptions.
Eachtraining example presented on the computer screen consisted of a verbal
description of an actionand a question. Subjects in the inflate condition sawdie
question "Do youthinkthat theballoon willbe inflated by thisperson?" Subjects in
the alpha condition sawthe question "Do youthinkthis is an example of an Alpha?"
Each verbal description initially spears as "A <SIZE> <COLOR>balloon was
<ACTION> by a <AGE>." A subject could request to see a value for any of the
attributes by moving a pointerto the attribute name and pressinga buttonon the
mouse. When this was done, the value for the attribute name replaced the attribute
name in the verbal stimuli. For example, a subject might point at <COLOR> and then
press themouse button. Tte effectof this action mightbe to change the stimuli to "A
<S1ZE> red balloon was <ACnON> by a <AGE>." Next, the subjectmight point at
<ACTION> andclick, changing thedescription to"A <SIZE> redballoon wasdipped
in water bya <AGE>." Figure 4 shows a sample display with dievalues of two
attributes filled in. The attributes selected by the subject were recorded(hieach trial..
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Subjects were allowed to selectas few or as manyattributes on each trial. However, to
discourage simplyselecting all attributes, subjects had to hit an extra key to confinn
that they wanted to see the third and fourth attribute.
PLACE HGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
A pilotstudy revealed some interesting information. Subjects in the inflate group
ackpri to see the size attribute much more often than expected. When asked about the
need to see this information, a common reply was that large balloons were easier to
inflate than small balloons. Subjects in pilot studies for Experiments 1 did not
mention size as a possible relevant factor. The difference in stimuli may accountfor
this difference. In Experiment3, verbal descripticms of actions were used. In
Experiments 1, photographs wereused. The small balloon in Experiment 1 is a 9 inch
balloon and the large balloonis a 13 inch balloon. One subject in the pilot study of
Experiment 3 was later shownthe photographs used in Experiment 1 and reported that
the "small" balloons in the photogr^hs were actually medium-sized balloons.
Therefore, in the analysis of Experiment 3, the attribute color is considered to be the
only irrelevantattribute, and the attributesize, action, and age are consideredto be
potentially relevant.
The experiment follows a 2 ^ 20 trial mixed design with one between-subjects
factor (Instructions- inflate vs. alpha) and one within-subjects factor (Trial- number of
the learning trial ranging from 1 to 20). On each trial, starting with the first trial, the
proportion of irrelevant attributes considered is recorded. As in Simulation 3, this
proportion is calculated by dividing theniunber of irrelevant attributes considered by
the total number of attributes considered.
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Method
Subjects. The subjects were 34 undergraduates attending the University of
California, Irvine who participated in this experimentto receiveextra credit in an
introductory psychology course. Subjects were randomly assigned to oneof thetwo
conditions (al^rtia or inflate). Seventeen subjects in eachcondition were tested
simultaneously in a room equipped with Apple Macintosh II computers. Each subject
worked individually on a separate computer.
Srimuii The stimuli were verbal descriptions of an action. Twenty stimuli were
constructedand shown in the randomlyselectedorder used for Simulation3. The
descriptions varied according to thecolor of theballoon (red or blue), the size of the
balloon (small or large), the ageof the actor (adultor child), and the action the actor
is performing (either dipping it in water or stretching it). Thedescriptions were
displayed ondiescreen of anAn>le Macintosh II computer in a fixed order. Subjects
couldinteract withdie display by asking the computer to showdie valueof any (or all)
attributes. Positive feedback was given for those stimuli whose age is adult or whose
action is stretching.
Procedures. The instructions read by the two groups differed in only one line
("determine if this example is an 'alpha'" as opposed to "determine whether the
balloon will be inflated successftiUy by this person"). After readingthe instructions,
subjects were given theopportunity to practice using a mouse to move thepointer and
to press themouse button to indicate a selection. Next, thesubjects repeated a cycle of
seeing a tpmpiatf! action, asking to view some or all attributes of theaction, and
indicating a prediction bymoving a pointer to theword "Yes"or to theword "No",and
pressing a button toanswer the question. If the subject selected the correct answer, the
computer simply displayed amessage tothis effect. However, if the subject selected
the wrong answer, the computer replaced all attributes with their values, and informed
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the subject that the answer was incorrea. When the subject was done studying the
screen, a button was pressed to go on to the next example. This cycle was repeated
twenty times for each subject.
Re.sults and Discussion
Figure 5 displays diemean proportion of irrelevant attributes selected oneachtrial
for the inflate and alpha conditions. The subjects in the inflate condition wereless
likely to request to seethe colorattribute thanthesubjects in die alpha ccHidition. An
arcsinetransformation was s^lied to the proportiondata and an analysisof variance
revealed that there was a main effect for Instructions, £(1.32) =9.89, Ms^ = 20.73, p.
< .01. The interaction between Instructions and Trial and the main effect of Trial were
not significant.
PLACE nOURE 5 ABOUT HERE
A simple manipulation in the instructions influenced the attributes the subjects
attended to during learning. In a classification task with neutral instructions, the
subjects have no reason to initially ignore color or any other attribute. However, when
the same stimuli are used to make predictions about inflating balloons, subjects are
more likely to ignore the color of the balloon. Subjectsfavored attributes diat prior
knowledge indicates are likely to influence the ease of inflating a balloon.
Experiment 4
Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that human subjectslearn more rapidly when
hypotheses areconsistent withtheirpriorbackground knowledge. Oneexplanation for
this finding is that hypotheses not consistent withpriorknowledge arenotconsidered
unlesshypotheses consistent with priorknowledge are ruledout Experiment 4 tests
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this idea using a redundant relevant cue experiment modeled afterSimulation 4. As
with Simulation 4, both the action and the color are equally consistent with the
feedback on the training data.
An implication of the computational model is that the number of subjects who
predict onthe basis ofdie action attribute fortlw inflate task will begreater than the
number of subjects who classify on thebasis of diisattribute for theali^ia task. The
reason forthis prediction is thatthestretching is a factor thatis known to influence the
inflation of a balloon.
Method
Subjects. Thesubjects were 54undergraduates drawn firom dwsame population
as those in Experiment 1. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the two
conditions (alpha or inflate).
Srimuii The stimuli consisted of pages from a photo album identical to those of
Experiment 1. Eachpage contained a close-up photograi^of a balloon thatvaried in
color and size and a idiotograidi of a person doing somethingto the balloon.
However, the pages werenow constnicted so that for the trainingmaterialthe color
yeUow waspaired withthe action stretcfiing and thecolorpurple was paired with the
actiondippingin water. In the test, these pairings were reversed so diat purple was
associatedwith stretching and yellow with dippingin water. A total of eight training
examples andeight test examples wereconstructed. Subjects received positive
feedback only on pages showing balloons that had been stretched.
Procedures. Subjects in the two groups read instructions that diHered in only one
line ("predictwhether diepage is anexample of an 'alpha' " as opposed to "predict
whether the balloon will be inflated"). The training data were presented to subjects in
random orders. The subjects weretrained on ths training set untilthey wereable to
accurately classify six pages in a rpw. Subjects received positive feedback on the
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I^otogr^hs that included a person of any age stretching a yellow balloon of any size.
Then, the subjects entered a test phase in which they predicted the category of test
examples without feedback.
Results and Discussion
In this experiment, in the inflatecondition 26, subjects formed hypotheses using
only the action attribute, 0 subjects used onlythecolorattribute, and2 subjects used a
combinationof attributes, respectively. In the ali^ coiKlition, the corresponding
numbers were 13,8, and 7. Analysis of the dato indicatesthat the hypothesisselection
biases of the subjects in the infiatp. condition differed flom thosein the alpha condition
(X^ (2,^= 54) =15.11, ji< .01). The results ofthis experiment indicate that human
subjects favorhypotheses consistent with the data and priorknowledge over those
hypotheses consistent with the data but not consistent with prior knowledge.
The hypothesisproducedby POSTHOC with an influenceflieory is dw hypothesis
most commonly formed by subjects in the inflate condition of Experiment 4. In its
current form, PoSTHoc cannot accoimt for those subjects that i^oduce alternative
hypothesesin this condition. In addition, POSTHOC does not adequately model the
finding that in the absence of prior knowledge, one attribute discriminations are
preferred to conjunctive descriptions in a redundant relevantcue experiment (Bower &
Trabasso, 1968).
Hypothesizing in Concept Acquisition
In order to more fully validatePosTHOc, it would be desirableto comparethe
intermediate hypotheses generated by PosTHOc withthe hypotheses of subjects prior
to converging on the correcthypothesis. Several previous studieshave investigated the
role of verbal reports of intermediate hypotheses onconcept acquisition (e.g., Byers &
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Davidson, 1967; Dominowski, 1973; Indow, Dewa, &Tadokoro, 1974; Indow &
Suzuki, 1972). Strong correlations were found between verbal reports of hypotheses
and the subjects' true hypotheses. Furthermore, the verbal reports did not affea
factors such as the learning rate or number of errors made.
A variety of verbal report studies were run in an attempt to havesubjects give
verbal reports (either oral orwritten) oftheir intermediate hypotheses following a
methodology similar to these previous studies. However, one modification was
necessary to the instructions. In theprevious studies of other researchers, the
instructions informed the subject of the logical form of theconcept to be learned (e.g.,
a conjunction of two attributes). Inour verbal report studies, and all odierexperiments
in this paper, the instructions did not include information of the logicalform of the
concept to be learned. Including this information would affectthe observed learning
rate (Haygood & Bourne, 1965) interfering with the dependent variable measured
Gearning rate of conjunctive vs. disjimctive concepts). In theseverbalreportstudies,
requiring verbalreports appeared to makethe problem moredifficult. As a result,
very few subjectswereable to complete the learningtask. For the subjectsthat did
complete the task, the meanlearningratesdifferedsubstantially from the earlier
experiments reportedhere. Furthermore, subjects' reportsof tlwir hypothesesdid not
always agree with the prediction made on the next example. For example, requiring
verbal reports increased the mean number of trials for learning conjimctive ctmcepts
with the alpha instructions to over 30, as compared to 13.8 in Experiment 2. Because
the results are not interfHetable, they are not reported here.
The difference in instructions appears to be responsible for the discrepancy
betweenthe verbal report studies and the earlierfindings. If some aspectof the
learning process, suchas thedetection of covariation is unconscious to some extent,
asking fora verbal report may change the nature of the task. Forcing subjects to
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become more conscious ofthe processes may make the task more difficult. This
hypothesis is consistent with findings by Reber and Lewis (1977) who present
evidence that subjects can learn some rules without having conscious access to the
rules. Lewicki (1986) refines this finding by showing that subjects detea correlations
and make classifications based on these correlations without being able to verbally
report on the correlation. Furthermore, Reber (1976) has shown that asking subjects
to look for regularities in the data adversely affects the learning rate and accuracy.
Nisbett and Wilson (1977) report that for some tasks, verbal reports on decision
making criteria differ from the criteria that subjects are using. The discrepancies in
the verbal report smdies between subjects' reports oftheir hypotheses and their
classifications on subsequent trials appears to be another example of this phenomenon.
Other researchers have refined the conditions under which verbal reports of decision
making criteria are likely to be accurate (Ericsson &Simon, 1984; Kraut &Lewis,
1982; Wright &Rip, 1981). More empirical research is needed to clarify the effects of
verbal reports on concept learning. One tentative hypothesis is that either requiring a
verbal rule, or informing subjects that the concept to be learned can be represented as a
logical rule of acertain form increases conscious awareness of the learning process and
hinders the imconscious detection of covariation.
Brooks (1978) has shed some light on the conditions under which verbal reports
hinder concept leanung. Brooks has demonstrated that instructions to form an abstract
rule may interfere with the storage ofindividual instances. This interference with
memory storage hinders making future classifications by analogy to stored instances.
Although 1agree with Brooks that this form ofanalogical reasoning is common,
accounting for the experimental findings in this paper with an analogical reasoning
model would require explaining how prior knowledge affects the analogical reasoning
process along with the storage and retrieval ofanalogous instances.
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Discussion
Experiments 1and 2 demonstrated that human subjects learn more rapidly when
hypotheses are consistent with prior knowledge. POSTHOC also learns more rapidly
when hypotiieses are consistent with an influence theory. In POSTHOC, the explanation
for the faster learning rate is that it is searching a smaller space ofhypotheses (i.e.,
those consistent withthe dataand theinfluence theory). Simulation 3 andExperiment
3demonstrate that the hypotlwsis space is reduced by ignoring those attributes deemed
irrelevant by prior knowledge. Simulation 4 and Experiment 4 demonstrated the
reduced hypothesis space by investigating the types ofhypotheses produced when
there aremultiple hypotheses consistent with thedata.
Intills article, the prior knowledge of a subject has been shown toinfluence tiie
learning ofinedictive relations for actions and their effects. Tlrere is some evidence
that the influence ofprior knowledge isnot restricted tothis situation. Inparticular,
when subjects are aware ofthe function ofan object, it has been shown that they attend
more to attributes of theobject thatarerelated to theobject's function thanto attributes
that are predictive ofclass membership but not related tofunctionality (Wismewski,
1989). In addition, Barsalou (1985) hasshown thatthegraded structure of goal
oriented categories (e.g., foods not toeatona diet) is influenced by prior knowledge
of ideals (e.g., zero calories).
Currently, POSTHOC islimited inseveral ways. First, itonly deals with positive
influences. In addition, the influence language doesnot include informatitMi on tiie
potency ofeach influence. Zelano and Shultz (1989) have argued that subjects make
use of such information when learning causal relationships.
A secondlimitationof POSTHOC is the inabilityto leam new influences. A
hypothesis that is not supported by an influence theory can be learned, but the
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influence theory is not currently updated. If the influence theory were updated, then
POSTHOC could use the knowledge it has acquired in one task to facilitate learning on
another task.
A third limitation is that POSTHoc does not account for some fundamental
categorization effects. For example, PostHoc doesnot model i^ierumena such as the
effects of typicality (Barsalou, 1985), basic leveleffects (Corter, Gluck, & Bower,
1988) or the acquisition of concepts that cannotbe specified as a collection of
necessary and sufficient features (Smith& Medin, 1981). However, background
knowledge plays a role in these processes. For example, several experiments have
shown (Barsalou, 1985; Murphy & Wisniewski, 1989) that the prior Imowledge of a
subject affects typicalityjudgments,but no detailedprocesshas been proposedto
account for these findings. Brown(1958)has suggested that the knowledge of the
leamer plays a role in determining the basic level. It would be interesting to explore the
role of background knowledge in computational models of these processes.
The simulations and experiments also point out a shortcoming of models of human
learning based on the prior work on purely exi^anation-based medKxls. It is not likely
that the prior knowledge of human subjects can be represented as a set ofnecessary
and sufficient conditions ct^able of supporting a deductive proof of why particular
balloons were inflated. Rather, die prior knowledge can be ai^lied more flexibly to
allow for several concepts to be considered consistent. The influence theory used by
POSTHOC provide one means of making explanation-based learning more flexible.
In spite of its limitations, the construction of POSTHoc has been useful in
developing hypotheses about the influence of prior knowledge on human learning.
Predictions resulting from simulations have led to experimental findings on human
learning. Giventhe currentdomainof inflating balloons, it wasnot possible to test
predictions of Simulation 5 concerning the relationship between thequality of the
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domain knowledge and the learning rate. Testing this hypothesis will require first
training subjects on new domain knowledge before the classification task. In contrast,
the current experiments rely on knowledge brought to the experimentby the subject.
Conclusion
I havepresented eiq^erimental evidence thatpriorknowledge influences the ease of
concept acquisition andbiases the selection of hypotheses in human learners. Although
often overiooked or controlled for, the prior knowledge of the learner may be as
influential as the informational structure of the environment in concept learning.
A computational modelof this learningtask was developed that qualitatively
accoimts for differences in human learning rates and for hypothesis selecticmbiases.
Predictionsof the computational model were tested in additionalexperiments and the
model's ability to leam with incorrea and incomidete backgroundtheories was
evaluated.
The ability of human learners to leam relativelyquickly and accuratelyin a wide
variety of circumstances is in sharp contrast to current machine learning algorithms. I
hypothesize tiiat this versatility comesfrom the ability to jqjply relevantbackgroimd
knowledge to the learning task and the ability to fall back on weaker methods in the
absence of this backgrotmd knowledge. In POSTHOC, I have shown how the
empiricaland analytical learningmethods can cooperate in a single framewoik. to leam
accurate predictiverelationships. POSTHOC leams most quicklywith a completeand
correct influence theory but is still able to make use of background knowledge when
conditions diverge from this ideaL
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Footnotes
1. As part of a previous experiment (Fazzani, in press), 80 UCLA
undergraduates were asked several true-false questions concerning what balloons are
more likely to be inflated. All of die subjects indicated that stretching a balloon makes
it easier to inflate, that adults can inflate balloons more easily than small children and
that the color of a balloon does not affect the ease of inflation. Seventy-two percent of
the subjectsfelt that the shapeof the ballooninfluenced the ease of inflatioiL Of these
subjects, 63% felt that long balloons wereharder to inflate than roundballoons and the
remainderfelt that long balloonswere easier. In the experimentsin this paper, all of
the balloons were round balloons.
2. We thank Richard Doyle for pointing out this explanation.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. The ease of acquiring disjunctive and conjunctive concepts as a
function of the instnictions. The disjunctive relationship is consistent with prior
knowledge onthe ease of inflating balloons, while the conjunctive relationship violates
these beliefs.
Figure 2. The productions used byPOSTHOC learning disjunctive and conjunctive
concepts that are consistent, neutral, or incOTSistent with prior knowledge.
Fiyure 3. The mean proportion of irrelevant attributes selected byPOSTHoc
simvilating the inflate and alpha instructions. This proportion is calculated bydividing
the number of irrelevant attributes considered by the total number of attributes
considered. Tlwthreegraphs plot thedatawhen the probability of randomly
considering anattribute was 0.1 (upper), 0.5 (rruddle), and0.9 (lower). Inflate is the
the total proportion of irrelevant attributes considered in tiie ali^ condition andis
identical to tiieproportion of irrelevant attrilnites selected randomly. Ali^Rand is
the [xoprtion of irrelevant features selected randomly in the a^ha condition. Alpha
Hvois proportion of irrelevant features in tiiehypothesis. AlphaTotal is the total
proportion of irrelevant attributes considered in the alpha condition.
Figure4. An examfde of the stimuliused in Experiment 3.
Figure 5. Themeanproportion of irrelevant attributes selected by subjects
reading the inflate and alpha instructions.
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The influence theory used to model subjects' knowledge of inflating balloons.
(easier strong-actor inflate)
(easier more-elastic inflate)
(implies [act stretch] more-elastic)
(implies old-actor strong-actor)




II . IF there is an influence that is present in the example
THEN initialize the hypothesis to a single conjunction representing the features
of that influence.
12. OTHERWISE initialize the hypothesis to a conjunction of all features of the
initial example.
Errors of ommision:
01. IF the hypothesis is consistent with the influence theory
AND there are features that indicate an additional influence
THEN create a disjunction of the current hypothesis and a conjunction of the
features of the example indicative of the influence.
02. IF the hypothesis is a single conjunction
AND a feature of the conjunction is not in the example
AND the conjunction consists of more than one feature
THEN drop the feature from the conjunction
03. OTHERWISE create a new disjunction of the current hypothesis and a random
feature from the example and simplify the disjunction.
Errors of comission:
01. IF the hypothesis is consistent with the background theory
AND for each true conjunction there are features not present in the current
example that would be necessary for an influence
THEN modify the conjunction by adding the additional features that are
indicative of the influence.
02. OTHERWISE specialize each true conjunction of the hypothesis by
adding the inverse of a feature of the example that is not in the conjunction
and simplify.
